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Seven stages. Every audit.
Same pipeline, every time. Output is byte-identical across runs — enforced by a determinism harness on every release.
Eight lenses. One report.
Each agent reasons over your code with a different threat model. A critic refutes the noise. Foundry confirms the rest.
FirstPrinciples
Novel attack patterns the others miss — fresh review against the pashov taxonomy.
VectorScan
Known vulnerability patterns: reentrancy, unchecked calls, CEI, RNG.
MathPrecision
Overflow, precision loss, division order, rounding.
AccessControl
Missing modifiers, tx.origin, privilege escalation paths.
EconomicSecurity
Oracle manipulation, flash loans, AMM invariants, MEV.
ExecutionTrace
External-call flow, return-value handling, callbacks.
Invariant
Threat-model violations and protocol invariants.
Periphery
Library and interface misuse, ERC conformance.
Findings you can act on.
Proofs you can verify.
Every Critical or High finding ships with a Foundry test that proves the bug — and a counterexample showing the exact transaction sequence that breaks your invariants.
Reentrancy in withdraw() allows fund drainage
The external call in withdraw()is executed before the user's balance is decremented. A malicious contract can re-enter withdraw() inside its receive() hook and drain the vault.
- 1Attacker deposits 1 ETH into the vault
- 2Attacker calls withdraw() from a malicious contract
- 3Vault sends ETH; attacker's receive() re-enters withdraw()
- 4Loop drains every other depositor's balance to zero
Apply the checks-effects-interactions pattern: decrement balances[msg.sender] before the external .call, or wrap the function with OpenZeppelin's nonReentrant modifier.
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount, "low");
// ⚠️ external call before state update
(bool ok, ) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");
require(ok, "transfer failed");
balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
}function invariant_no_drain() public {
uint256 totalBalances = 0;
for (uint i = 0; i < users.length; i++) {
totalBalances += vault.balances(users[i]);
}
assertLe(totalBalances, address(vault).balance);
}[FAIL] invariant_no_drain
Counterexample:
sender: 0xa11ce
sequence: [
vault.deposit{value: 1 ether}(),
attacker.attack(), // re-enters withdraw
]
invariant_no_drain(): totalBalances=1e18 > vault.balance=0What other audits don't give you.
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